Introduction
China's attention to environmental protection has evolved along with its development model.
Over the past ten years, the government has emphasised a shift away from previous reliance on heavy industry, investment-driven growth toward a service sector-oriented, consumption-driven growth model, although only recently has this shift begun in earnest. Especially after an acute episode of bad air quality over Beijing in January 2013, 1 the government has shown increasing resolve to tackle the problem of air pollution, issuing a series of State Council edicts that call for sharp curbs on polluting industries. 2 These changes came largely in response to a recognition that past policies were not doing enough to curb activities contributing to air pollution, especially the formation of PM2.5, which carries the most severe health effects. These changes have attracted international attention and praise, both for their impacts on air pollution as well as their potential to reduce China's sizeable contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, largely by displacing coal.
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But these shifts beg an important question: are patterns of governance-which are in many respects highly decentralized-also evolving in ways that support implementation of these policies?
Conventional wisdom holds that when it comes to environmental protection, broadly speaking, Beijing sets the rules and the localities are expected to implement them with limited support from central authorities. 4 While in the past this system has succeeded in curbing pollution in 1 On January 13, 2013, the concentration of fine particulate matter (PM 2.5) reached an average of 755 per cubic meter in Beijing, more than 30 times the World Health Organization's upper limit for safe air, and double the average for bad days in Beijing. In fact, the pollution episode covered one-sixth of China's territory, and demonstrated that the pollutants from China's soaring energy consumption are increasing, and neither the laws nor the governmental actions taken so far have been effective to reduce air pollution (CNEMC (China National Environmental Monitoring Center) 2013).
2 These edicts include the 12th Five Year Plan on Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Key Regions (Dec 2012), the Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Sept 2013) , and the Provisional Measures to Inspect the Actual Implementation of the Action Plan on Air Pollution Prevention and Control (May 2014) . 3 For examples, see (Garnaut 2014) and (Green and Stern 2015) . 4 (Wong and Bird 2008; Wong 1991) .
some areas, results were highly variable and enforcement was plagued by discord between local growth and environmental objectives. Here we examine how a specific dimension of the Chinese institutional setting-fiscal relationships between central and local authorities-enable or constrain progress in China's "war" on air pollution. We focus specifically on implementation of policies in the region comprised of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei, referred to as Jing-Jin-Ji (JJJ). 7 We focus on Hebei Province in particular as a case study, given its large size and contribution to pollution within and beyond its borders. As a major center of iron and steel production among other industrial activities, and given its close proximity to Beijing, Hebei Province has quickly responded to-or even preempted with more aggressive actions-national initiatives aimed at addressing air pollution (TCBH, 2015) .
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the evolution and rollout of policies, placing in historical context the magnitude and significance of China's presently proposed effort. The constituent policies are discussed-the industries and geographies they target, implementation timelines, and the mechanisms that will be used to enforce them. Section 3 assesses how systems of governance, including the fiscal system, are being called upon to support policy implementation. Section 4 concludes by asking whether or not systems of governance are capable of implementing the new policy directions.
5 (Economy 2010) 6 (Tatlow 2014) 7 Jing-Jin-Ji is the transliteration of the three character abbreviation referring to the Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan largely built on this momentum, continuing the energy and climate change policy directions set out in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. Broadly, the plan included more language focused on jieneng jianpai ("energy saving and emissions reduction") and ditan ("lowcarbon"). The plan also included a binding target to reduce CO 2 intensity by 17% during the plan period of 2011-2015, which was supported by an energy intensity reduction target of 16% and a non-fossil primary energy target of 11.4%. A redoubled focus on air pollution clean-up entered the policy mix after a series of very polluted days in January of 2013 (the aforementioned "airpocalypse") prompted widespread outcry. The outcry has persisted, stoked by an increasingly prolific media attention on air pollution's causes and consequences. A prominent example is the Under The Dome documentary by journalist Chai Jing that blended facts about the effects of degraded air with personal stories and concerns that resonated with many urban Chinese, prompting over 100 million views in the days follow its release.
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More than ever before, air pollution has shared, even monopolized, the policy spotlight in recent years. Much of China's energy and climate policy agenda has been recast in terms of the co-benefits for energy security and CO 2 emissions mitigation that will accrue to air pollution control efforts.
Intentions have been codified in a series of government documents released since 2012. Starting 8 (Ma and Ortolano 2000) 9 (Buckley 2015) Wong & Karplus in PM2.5 concentrations in many cities located in JJJ (25% is the regional reduction target, see Table   1 for the full list). Beijing was further assigned a specific target to keep the annual average concentration of PM 2.5 at or below 60µg/cubic meter. 13 The APAP was further designed to be consistent with existing efforts to reduce energy intensity, as the plan calls for a 20% reduction in energy intensity between 2012 and 2017, limits coal to 65 percent of primary energy used, and prohibits any increase in coal use in the three regions of JJJ, YRD and PRD.
14 In addition to these targets, the ten-point action plan includes specific measures for limiting emissions by mandating a shift to larger scale facilities, eliminating outdated and substandard furnaces, and installing pollution control equipment. Centralized district heating systems are targeted for retrofits to use cleaner fuels such as electricity or natural gas. Installation and operation of desulfurization, denitrification, and dust removal equipment is required for industrial boilers and furnaces.
Much of the Action Plan is a reworking of measures earlier introduced in the Twelfth FYP APPC, but there are new elements. The APAP calls for creating a new air pollution prevention and control mechanism in which the government takes the leading role but invites participation from enterprises and the public, and incorporates market incentives. This mechanism also calls for regional collaboration, and establishes monitoring, alert and emergency response systems for air pollution episodes. 15 In a departure from the traditional focus on production units, the APAP also targets pollution from vehicles, calling for an increase in the share of public transportation, mandating phase out of older automobiles not meeting pollution standards ("yellow label" vehicles), and other measures. Regions 17 (Rules) were issued jointly by the MEP, the NDRC, the MOF, and other agencies, to emphasize the urgency of controlling air pollution in the JJJ area and to spell out the tasks facing local governments. The Rules set targets-in many cases, highly-specific technology-related targets-for reducing PM 2.5 concentrations, eliminating and upgrading generators, boilers and equipment in the major polluting industries, and switching to cleaner energy. The Rules also provided a road map for industrial restructuring in the region, including the elimination of excess capacity in several polluting industries and raising energy efficiency in existing installations in the covered industries.
While some of the targets apply universally to all six provinces and municipalities, Hebei was given significantly more stringent targets for cutting coal consumption and eliminating obsolete production capacity. Tables 1 and 2 show the specific targets for the six provinces and municipalities.
Hebei's target of 40 million tons is nearly half of the total net coal reduction assigned to the region.
Excess capacity cuts in Hebei's targeted industries are also significantly larger than those assigned to neighbouring provinces. Part of the reason for the focus on Hebei is its proximity to Beijing, and the resulting impact on air quality in the capital. particularly detailed-and handed down to the respective levels of government, which are in principle obliged to implement them. In the case of air pollution control, large changes to the energy system may be needed-installation and operation of pollution removal equipment at plants is often costly, and in some cases a full rework or rebuild of plant systems are required. As a last resort, plants are shut down. Table 2 shows each province's mandated compliance strategy, which for each province includes a mixture of upgrades and relocations for firms in pollution-intensive industries.
3. Policy Implementation: Governance Structures
Administrative divisions and staffing
Although China is a unitary country, the central government is small, and the administration is highly decentralized. Staffing at the central level accounts for less than 5 percent of the total civilian administration, both for core government (59,000 out of 12.4 million) and for the broader public sector, which includes service providers such as schools, hospitals and clinics (around 1.9 million out of 41 million). Under the central government, there are 43,000 subnational (or local) governments distributed over four levels-the provincial, prefectural/municipal, county, and township levels China's central government implements policies through an extensive system of delegation.
The process begins with delegating authority to provinces and depending on each of them to carry out their responsibilities within their territory. The provinces in turn delegate to their municipalities and depend on them to deliver on their assigned responsibilities, and so on down through the hierarchy. At each step, the relationship is bilateral, and each level manages only the next layer of subordinate units and holds them accountable for performance. The resulting structure is a nested, hierarchical pyramid, where policies and resources are transmitted downward level by level, to where the services are delivered. The Chinese Communist Party plays a vital role in bolstering the central government's capacity to hold lower levels accountable, mostly through controlling the system of personnel appointment and promotion. While some studies have found these systems effective, others have shown that in practice cadres are evaluated on multiple metrics, diluting attention and accountability. This system relies on the ability of local leaders to persuade local actors to comply, for example, by bundling energy efficiency objectives with the objectives of politicallyinfluential groups.
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In this bottom-heavy administrative structure, almost all public services are delivered by local governments at the third and fourth levels-by municipalities/prefectures and counties and urban districts. 20 This is reflected in the distribution of budgetary expenditures across the levels of government. By far the largest share is spent by counties and districts, which has grown to account for nearly half of total spending nationwide. Prefectures and municipalities spend about one-quarter, and the remainder is split between the central and provincial governments, with the central government's share falling just short of 15 percent.
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The degree of decentralization in China has varied over time, and the fiscal system is no exception. Historically, revenues were collected locally. Revenue collection was centralized in the 1994 fiscal reforms but expenditures remained highly concentrated at the lower levels. As a result, a significant share of collected revenues at the central level is returned to the provinces as transfers.
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In addition to funding local government budgets, these transfers have strengthened-at least nominally-central control over expenditures. This control is attenuated, however, by the fact that each level of government can only enforce policy at the level directly below it. To strengthen central government control, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, an attempt was made to recentralize the management of some functions of sub-provincial governments to the provincial level-for example, the local tax bureaus and agricultural extension bureaus were placed under "vertical management"
by their provincial counterparts. 23 This process has been referred to as "soft recentralization". 
Spending on environmental protection and clean up
While the central government sets environmental policy, its direct expenditure in the broad category of "energy saving and environmental protection" (jieneng huanbao) was only 2.4 percent of the national total in the 2013 budget (Table 3 ). In the subcategory of pollution prevention, the 21 Calculated from . (MOF (Ministry of Finance) 2014) 22 (Wong and Bird 2008; Wong 2012) 23 (Fock and Wong 2008) 24 (Mertha 2005) Wong & Karplus DRAFT -DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE 9/3/2015 11 central government input was only 0.6 percent (see Table 3 ). On the face of it, this looks much like the past pattern in which policy pressure comes from above, while the resources to implement the new directives are largely expected to be supplied by local governments. The reality, however, is far more complex after the growth and expansion of transfer programs over the past 15 years. As shown in Table 3 , earmarked transfers to local governments for energy saving and environmental protection were CNY 170 billion, equal to 50% of total national budgetary expenditure in that category. In other words, even though its own direct expenditures account for only a tiny share of the expenditure in energy saving and environmental protection, the central government is financing half of the total through transfers. The expansion of the transfer program will be further discussed below for the case of Hebei. Xiaoqing, announced at a press conference in March 2014 that CNY 5 trillion may be spent on the "War on Pollution" during the Twelfth FYP period. The cost of the APAP alone is estimated to be more than CNY 1.7 trillion during 2013-2017, with more than one-third of it used for retrofitting industrial enterprises (see Table 7 ). Area and pollution source control 60.5 3.5
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Environmental capacity-building 27 1.5
Clean coal utilization 23.6 1.4
Operational cost 85 4.9
Total

100
Source: Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, MEP, 2013.
These estimates appear to include only the engineering costs of implementing the seven actions called for in the APAP (Table 4 ). In addition, the Deputy Director and Chief Engineer of the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (CAEP), a research institution affiliated with the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Wang Jinnan, explained that there will be indirect costs in the form of a reduction of GDP and employment levels, estimated at CNY 115 billion and 140,000 jobs over the duration of the APAP. At the same time he argued that the rise of new industries to deliver environmental protection measures will create an additional GDP of CNY 2 trillion and 2.6 million new jobs, which it is argued will more than make up for the losses. 26 A People's Bank of China report in spring of 2015 estimated that CNY 2 trillion would be needed over the five years to meet pollution reduction targets, with government budgets covering about 15% of the total.
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How these costs will be divided up between public coffers, industries, and households is not fully clear, but a few observations are worth noting. The central government is very rich; in 2014 it had revenues of CNY 6.4 trillion, expenditures of CNY 2.2 trillion, and a "surplus" of CNY 4.2 trillion.
Local governments also have far more fiscal resources than in the past-on average, a county/district had expenditures of RMB100 million in 1998. This had grown to RMB1.8 billion by
2012. Even deflated, they had grown by 14 fold. However, more than half of these expenditures 25 (People's Daily 2014) 26 Ibid. 27 (Hornby 2015) were financed by transfers. 28 The reality, then, is that localities have limited bandwidth to increase environmental spending without additional support from the centre.
The Case of Hebei
Hebei allows a deeper look at how funding sources are combined in support of recent redoubled air pollution control efforts. Based on this case study, we argue that the central government has provided both direction-in many cases, highly detailed and technology-specific requirements-and significant funds. Yet this top-down approach is not supported by an alignment of personnel allocations and incentives across levels of governments to realize the central government's ambitions. So far at least, it appears that while the centre has put funding (in the form of transfers) behind its environmental ambitions, it has not yet strengthened staffing or accountability in ways that would ensure implementation. The fact that many of the detailed measures will reduce the size of Hebei's industrial sector and carry a hefty and localized price tag, will make measures tough for localities to swallow. The question essentially boils down to whether or not local authorities will carry out their delegated environmental responsibilities, especially when they prove to be at odds with short-term growth and economic stability.
Hebei as a centre of pollution-intensive industry
Major urban centres in Hebei grew rapidly over the first decade of the 2000s (as shown in The concentration of these highly polluting industries explains why Hebei's ambient pollution levels are 3 times higher than the national average, and PM 2.5 levels are consistently above 100 µg/m3. According to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), seven of the ten cities with the worst air quality in 2013 are located in Hebei (Table 5 ). Hebei produces the most nitric oxide (NO x ) and particulate matter (PM) in China, and is a major emitter of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ).
Given its high concentration of pollution-intensive industry, as well as its proximity to Beijing, it is no surprise that Hebei is a major target of national air pollution prevention and control efforts.
28 Wong (2011) , and updated calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.
Wong & Karplus DRAFT -DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE 9/3/2015 14 Tangshan, for example, is slated for significant cuts in pollution-intensive sectors-its reduction in steel production capacity of 40 million tons will reduce national steel capacity by around 27%, accounting for 67% of the capacity cut in Hebei. 
Assigning target responsibility to Hebei municipalities
The case of Hebei illustrates how air pollution reduction targets were handed down from the top. Given the short timelines for meeting the targets, Hebei did not wait for the official release of the APAP by the State Council before rushing to issue its own documents to implement the national policies on curbing air pollution. On September 6, 2013, the provincial government issued the Hebei 50-point Action Plan, outlining 50 areas of work for air pollution prevention and control within the 29 (ISI Emerging Markets 2015) 30 The MEP began to release the air quality standard of 74 Chinese cities on a monthly basis since February 2013. This is the first phase of the government's campaign in monitoring air quality in the country. These 74 cities are the first to implement the government's new air quality standard and are required to report air quality data to the MEP. See (Xinhuanet 2014) province. 31 The plan set specified targets for cutting coal consumption by 40 million tons and reducing iron and steel capacity by 60 million tons by 2017, with targets differentiated by locality and by industrial sector. The Hebei 50-Point Plan set a schedule for a mid-term assessment to be made in 2015, and a final assessment in 2017, with rewards and punishments for performance. It By September 18, 2013, the "Letter of Target Responsibility for Air Pollution Prevention and Control for Hebei" between the MEP and the province was signed in Beijing and published. The Letter is laid out in four parts. Part one states that the provincial government has overall responsibility for achieving the goals of the program: to improve air quality in Hebei by reducing the number of "bad pollution" days and increase the number of good days, and reducing the concentration of PM2.5 by 25 percent over the five years to 2017. Part 2 breaks down the key tasks: eliminating small coal-fired furnaces, accelerating the program to install pollution abatement equipment in the key industries, strengthening procedures for comprehensive dust control, strengthening control of motor vehicle pollution, and reducing total coal consumption. Part 3 of the Letter calls on "…the provincial government to establish the implementation details before the end of 2013, by step-by-step devolving the State targets for improving fine particulate concentrations and other key tasks to cities and counties, as well as to departments and key enterprises. This is to ensure a clear assignment of responsibilities for meeting the annual targets for the reduction of fine PM concentrations and other key tasks, and to lay out clear lines of accountability to ensure the year-by-year decline of PM concentrations." Part 4 states that the MEP will undertake an annual assessment of progress and report to the State Council, and the results will be announced to the public after State Council approval.
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The Letter commits the province to cutting coal consumption by 40 mts, reducing excess capacity in steel production by 60 mts, and eliminate capacity by 61 mts in cement production, and 36 million tons of plate glass production. Taken together, these tasks are referred to as the "6643 project." It makes clear that even though the province was assigned the overall responsibility for meeting air pollution targets, the real work of reducing pollution is to be done by lower level governments and enterprises. Wasting no time, the province convened the Hebei Air Pollution 33 While the substance and ambition of targets was different, in many respects the implementation processes showed few signs of departing from the target responsibility system that has long faced implementation challenges.
Distribution of the costs of the Hebei Action Plan
It is 35 (Xingjing News 2014) to curb air pollution through 2017, accounting for 20% of the total budget for curbing pollution in the province. The fiscal commitment of Hebei in curbing air pollution is significant, compared to other provinces, given the anticipated magnitude of the task (See Table 8 ). Table 8 . Financing for curbing air pollution: Hebei and the selected provinces Hebei:
• CNY 2.8 billion spent on curbing air pollution in 2013, of which CNY 2.6 billion given by the central government • allocate CNY 800 million on air pollution in 2014 • arrange CNY 4.38 billion and CNY 1.6 billion to set up a key industries development fund and a priority industries development fund respectively in 2014 • commit to spend CNY 90 billion to curb air pollution through 2017, accounting for 20% of the budget for curbing all forms of pollution in the province. Beijing:
• CNY 2.8 billion special fund for energy conservation and air pollution set up in 2013
• allocate CNY 3 billion in the special fund for energy conservation and air pollution in 2014 • allocate CNY 2 billion to support the Beijing Clean Air Action Plan initiative • divert CNY 1.24 billion from the special fund for technology, culture and tourism to use on Beijing's campaign for curbing air pollution in Beijing.
• commit to spend a total of CNY 760 billion to reduce PM2.5 pollutants through 2017. Shandong:
• set up a CNY 1.2 billion special fund for environmental protection and curbing air pollution Shenzhen:
• Allocate CNY 1.3 billion on curbing air pollution.
Source: Beijing News.
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Indeed, beyond iron and steel, energy-intensive industries across the board in Hebei will come under increasing pressure-as shown in Table 9 , Hebei represents a large share of the nation's cement, plate glass, and crude steel production, as well as more than half of the nation's coal consumption. Nearly half of Hebei's cement capacity is scheduled to be phased out, while cuts in plate glass and crude steel hover just above 25%. These cuts will impose a huge burden on the work force and local economy. Hebei officials worry that the reduction in production capacity in these industries would lead to job losses that, if not handled properly, could affect social stability. Job placement and retraining will be policy priorities. The Hebei party secretary estimated that social insurance and pension payouts will increase by CNY 13 billion per annum.
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Some localities will be hit very hard. In Tangshan, currently one of Hebei's economic engines, steel production per ton employs 17 workers and produces CNY 142 in fiscal revenues on average.
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These coefficients would translate the target cut of 40 mts into a loss of CNY 5.68 billion in tax revenues, against a tax base of CNY 32 bn. They would cut 68,000 jobs directly and affect another 340,000 indirectly, against a non-farm employment of 965,000 in the city in 2013. As share of national cuts 50% 75%
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* Enterprises above designated NBS scale for counting. ** Consumption.
Bottlenecks and Challenges
The case of Hebei reveals a significant misalignment of incentives and resources. The central government-which exercises direct control only at the provincial level-has outlined a program of actions unprecedented in the cuts, restructuring, or retrofits required. Ultimately, these actions will need to be accepted and implemented by officials at the lower levels of government. A critical question, therefore, is whether "soft recentralization" of authority at the provincial level is bridging the central-local gap and is capable of eliciting cooperation from local cadres and economic elites in the enforcement of action plan targets. Evidence of how local and central incentives diverge is widespread-for instance, directives by Beijing to shut down plants were enforced through the withdrawal of the equivalent of US $177 million in loans, only to be reopened following a merger arranged by the city government (Wei and Davis, 2014) . Indeed, the Xi government has indicated it will penalize polluters dearly-even by ruining their careers-as part of a "strike hard" campaign, 37 (People's Daily 2013) 38 These estimates are from the "Proposal on establishing pilot cities for resolving the problem of overcapacity" that was submitted to the Second session of the CPPCC National Committee meeting in 2014 by CPPCC member and vice-chairman of the CPPCC Tangshan City, Shen Jin. Reported in (Ding 2014 ).
Ibid., and (Hebei Statistical Yearbook 2014).
but this deterrent also seems to be one-size-fits-all, and without attention to the limited options many of these polluters face.
Many of the actions require significant capacity shutdowns within a few years-a move that creates high localized costs in service of accelerating the delivery of air quality benefits. Given the urgency of the task from Beijing's perspective, slower implementation does not seem to be an option. However, there seems to be little attention paid to identifying the "low-hanging fruit"-in other words, low cost but high impact measures that could help to improve local air quality. While a market-based mechanism could help to surface these opportunities, for instance, by pricing pollution, it is not clear that such a system would be compatible with China's broader institutional structure, which seems to be leaning even more heavily on detailed command-and-control style interventions that clearly assign responsibility.
Finally, the economic costs of cleanup actions and capacity phase-out will have concentrated impacts on local fiscal budgets, curbing an important source of local government revenue that could be used to fund the cleanup effort, among other government functions. Indeed, 45% of total fiscal expenditures occur at the county level and 22% at the prefectural level. Twelfth FYP and APAP actions will impact the local sources of these revenue streams, potentially making localities more dependent on transfers. Whether or not the central government, which has significant financial resources at its disposal, will help to fill the void is not clear from the plans. In fact, numbers presented above suggest exactly the opposite-that sub-national governments will be expected to pick up most of the tab.
Will this time be different? Prospects for winning the war on air pollution
Getting the incentives right-thought deployment of resources and design of enforcement mechanisms-will be critical to gaining ground in China's war on air pollution. While the level of central ambition exceeds that of the past, and the volume of transfers it is providing to offset costs is substantial, it is not clear that implementation processes have changed, although it is ultimately the latter that will determine results on the ground. Specifically, will the resources, fiscal or otherwise, be made available and applied at the county and prefectural level to make lasting changes in the local economy, against the wishes of incumbent enterprises and industries that have previously relied on the state to foot the bill-or at least to help out-with energy saving and environmental protection?
Here we document how fiscal arrangements, along with enforcement mechanisms, are expected to work in support of the energy saving and environmental protection goals in China Twelfth FYP and APAP. There are some cautious signs that the link between the central government and the provinces is being strengthened and more transfer income is being allocated at the provincial level to support pollution prevention and control efforts in localities. However, several potential gaps remain: real implementation will have to be done at the municipal and enterprise level, so emphasis on provincial authority will not directly address this gap. Beijing may be less efficient in deploying funds where they are needed, relative to governments at provinces and below. Also, it does not solve the fundamental problem that the government-and not the enterprises themselves-is broadly expected to foot the bill for a highly scripted transition. In other countries, enterprises have typically had to pay the costs of complying with environmental laws, while the government set the standards and provided modest support. Current policies will make it also more difficult to move towards market-based instruments, since in fact the policy shift is largely a retrenchment towards command-and-control and micro-management, which in many ways is at odds with establishing functional markets for pollution control. However, moving from ambition to results will require changes beyond central policy rhetoric that ensure incentive compatibility at the local levels through a reworking of political, fiscal, and organizational mechanisms that support implementation.
